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TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

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SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 19

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MILITARY

Negative

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO:	ACTION TAKEN	
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R

EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. Soviet External Relations. On May 7 the Soviet press announced that Khrushchev will head a government-party delegation to Bulgaria in the middle of May. This will be the first Khrushchev public visit abroad since his June 1961 trip to Vienna for the meeting with President Kennedy and his brief visit to Czechoslovakia en route, as the rumored Khrushchev meeting with Gomulka in Poland in January 1962 was never publicized. Khrushchev's resumption of foreign visits after a period of almost one year, during which he has concentrated mainly on Soviet internal affairs, suggests that even though no decisive break-through has been made in solving these problems, he may feel that he is losing momentum in his efforts to increase Soviet external influence and may be resuming more extensive personal diplomacy. It is possible also that Khrushchev feels that Eastern European and Balkan questions require his direct attention, especially in view of the problems created by developments at the 22nd CPSU Congress.

Khrushchev was involved in the reception of Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio and the Japanese Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Kono, who were in Moscow during the week. The announcements that President Keita of Mali and Chancellor Gorbach of Austria would visit Moscow in May and June respectively enhanced the impression that Khrushchev's schedule is becoming more crowded with foreign affairs activities.

2. Laos. The Soviet press initially has shown some hesitancy about how to handle the capture of Nam Tha in Northern Laos by the Communist side. Except for the instant and reflexive charge that this event represented a counter-attack in response to an offensive started by Phoumi's forces in Nam Tha as early as April 8, most papers, including Pravda, have remained silent since May 8 when the news was first reported. The only papers which did comment, Izvestiya and Red Star, seemed to be trying to advance the theme that Phoumi is really responsible for the violation of the May 3, 1961 ceasefire agreement (the anniversary of which had recently been noted in press articles), because of his refusal to agree to a coalition government. These papers also cast doubt on the US role in Laos, making it appear that the US really is encouraging Phoumi to disrupt a peaceful settlement and that reports that US is putting pressure on Phoumi are designed to deceive world opinion. Another theme was that the Laotian and Vietnamese situations are closely interconnected.

Aside from his participation on Moscow May 1 ceremonies, the press was silent about Kong Le's whereabouts in the USSR until May 8, when it reported that he had arrived in Prague the previous day. There was no indication when or if Kong Le would return to the USSR or what the results of his visit were.

3. NATO Meeting. Soviet commentary on the NATO meeting in Athens focused almost exclusively on discussions relative to transforming NATO into a so-called fourth nuclear power. The Soviets characterized the "Stikker Plan" advanced at the meetings as a modified version of the Norstad Plan, which has always been anathema to Moscow. In the opinion of the Soviets,

this plan represents the first step toward supplying nuclear weapons to the West Germans. Commentators were especially critical of the obligation assumed by the US to place Polaris submarines at the disposal of NATO and the pledge not to withdraw American nuclear weapons from a NATO country without the consent of the government concerned. These developments, according to the Soviets, were welcomed by the West Germans who are endeavoring to bar the way to an agreement on a de-nuclearized zone in Central Europe. It was further argued that the pledge regarding nuclear weapons meant that the Bonn government now has definite rights to nuclear weapons based in the FRG, thus enabling it to get still closer to full control over these weapons.

4. Nuclear Testing and Disarmament. While the Soviet press continued to publish news despatches from abroad reporting negative reactions to US atmospheric tests, less space was devoted to such coverage than during the previous weeks. The publication of protest statements by both Soviet and foreign organizations also declined.

In contrast to this trend, the Embassy began to receive its first protest telegrams. Most of the eight telegrams received purportedly resulted from meetings of "collectives" held in factories. The telegrams uniformly condemned US atmospheric testing and demanded that the US cease tests immediately. A few expressed concern over nuclear fallout. Thus far, the number received represents a trickle when compared to the 4,000 received following the abortive Cuban invasion in 1961 and the 791 and 840 respectively received in connection with the U-2 case and Lumumba's death.

News coverage from Geneva also fell off. One report called attention to Zorin's press conference statement that the Western powers were pursuing hypocritical maneuvers designed to lead the negotiations into an impasse. No mention has yet been made of a possible adjournment of the conference.

5. Subandrio Visit. Foreign Minister Subandrio of Indonesia visited Moscow from May 3 to May 9. During his visit he had meetings with Khrushchev and Kosygin, at which not only Foreign Minister Gromyko but Defense Minister Malinovsky were present, thus indicating quite plainly that military matters were involved. Subandrio revealed in a speech at a May 8 reception given for him by Kosygin that he had signed an agreement similar to the agreement signed by Nasution in 1961 and that more material aid was to be received by Indonesia from the USSR. But beyond this there was no hint about the content of the agreement and Subandrio's delegation and Indonesian Embassy officers were quite uncommunicative about the type and amount of material to be supplied by the Soviets. The posture adopted publicly by the Soviets during Subandrio's visit indicated little or no change from the position previously taken on West Irian by the USSR. This may be designed to afford the Indonesians flexibility in exploiting the visit psychologically against the Dutch, while at the same time seeking to avoid the impression that the USSR opposes a peaceful settlement.

6. Berlin/Germany. There was a fair amount of attention to Berlin in the Soviet press during this week. The Ulbricht interview by Soviet editors ADZHUBEI and SATYUKOV was printed by Pravda May 7 and a 20-minute film of the interview was carried on TV May 9. In his interview, Ulbricht generally avoided

bellicose language, but insisted on the disappearance of subversive centers, as well as removal of the occupation troops as prerequisite for an agreement on access. He also introduced a new argument to justify GDR control over all access, claiming the UN Headquarters Agreement provides a valid precedent for this.

Another theme in Ulbricht's interview--the projection of West Berlin as a declining city--was also featured in a two-page article in Za Rubezhom. The journal's deputy editor NAUMOV reported on his recent visit to the "front-city" and claimed that the "August 13 measures" taken by the GDR have occasioned a serious flight from the city by businesses, both large and small. Naumov also insisted that West Berlin continues to serve as a base for subversive activities against the GDR.

Chancellor Adenauer's visit to Berlin was presented in brief Soviet press reports as another example of the abuse of West Berlin for cold-war purposes. The press conference statements by the Chancellor, which caused such an uproar in the Western press, so far have been only briefly noted as proof of Bonn&s distrust of East-West discussions.

The 17th anniversary of "the liberation of Germany from Nazi fascism" was given more attention this year than last. In addition to the traditional exchange of formal messages between Ulbricht and Khrushchev, a large reception given by the GDR Embassy was attended by Kozlov and Kirilenko, and prominently reported in the Soviet press. The press also published a number of feature articles on the GDR and a full hour TV program was presented in honor of the occasion, which, last year, was noted only by the exchange of messages.

The arrival in Moscow of GDR Deputy Prime Minister Willi STOPH, on May 10, raised to four the number of SED politburo members apparently in the Soviet capital. Stoph joins LENSCHNER, NEUMANN, and MEWIS in a concentration of the Soviet Zone's top economic leaders, which suggests that basis decisions are being considered on how to bolster the East German regime.

7. Titov Visit to US. Titov's activities in the US, including his May 3 meeting with the President, was closely followed and reported in the Soviet press. Many papers carried a photograph of the President with Titov and American astronaut Glenn. This unusual gesture on the part of the Soviet press strengthened the impression, also conveyed by news reports, that Titov is being well and warmly received in the US,

8. Kenya. A group of Kenyans headed by John Keen visited the USSR from April 20 to May 3 at the invitation and under the sponsorship of the USSR Parliamentary Group. To the knowledge of the Embassy, the highest ranking Soviet official to receive the group was the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. During their stay, the group visited several factories, the normal tourist sites, and the Armenian Republic. It is the estimate of a British Embassy official that the group's visit here was in part at least motivated by a desire to see the Soviet Union, recognizing, too, that the USSR represents a potential source of technical assistance and aid when Kenya attains complete independence.

9. Other Visits. In addition to receiving Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio and preparing to travel to Sofia next week, Khrushchev also participated in the recent general increase of other visitors to Moscow.

On May 7, he received Japanese Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, KONO, who came to conclude an agreement on fishing rights.

On May 5, he received Cuban Ambassador Faure CHOMON, who will shortly be replaced. Earlier a delegation from the Cuban governing council, OIR, also called on Khrushchev. The delegation was led by the Minister of Public Works CIENFUEGO and OIR official ORDUQUI. They departed May 7.

GDR Deputy Prime Minister Stoph arrived in Moscow May 19.

On May 11 Belgium Queen mother Elizabeth ended her visit in connection with the Tchaikovsky musical competition in Moscow. While here she saw many top Soviet officials, including Khrushchev. Although the press reported such events, her visit was not played up.

The Tunisian State Secretary for Information and Cultural Affairs, KLIBI, was reported as present in Moscow by the press on May 9.

A Ceylonese parliamentary delegation headed by the Deputy Chairman of Parliament R. S. PELPOL is travelling in the USSR, according to press reports on May 9.

INTERNAL - POLITICAL

10. Leadership. During the week, N. S. Khrushchev demonstrated anew his remarkable personal energy by lending his presence to more than a dozen publicized functions. Five of these were attended as well by most of the Presidium members resident in Moscow. Like Khrushchev, who spoke twice during the week at the 50 year anniversary of Pravda and to the railroad workers meeting in Moscow, virtually all of the top leadership had a full schedule.

The release of former CC Secretary and Leningrad Oblast First Secretary SPIRIDONOV from both his Party posts (WEEKA No. 18 of May 4, 1962), continued to puzzle observers because there was an absolute dearth in Moscow of either solid information or rumor which might help explain the real reasons behind the move. There appeared to be no evidence which would closely identify fast-rising V. S. TOLSTIKOV, a Leningrad-area Party official throughout his career, with any Presidium member except KOZLOV.

Judging from press reports, Kozlov was more active during the week than any other single Presidium figure except First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. KOSYGIN, whose protocol functions kept him daily in the public eye.

After attending the Oblast Committee organizational plenum in Leningrad, Khrushchev stayed an extra day to christen a new tanker, the "Ulan Bator." In the absence of their Chairman, both of Khrushchev's First Deputy Chairmen,

Kosygin and A. I. MIKOYAN, acted in his stead in Moscow. Before the XXII CPSU Congress, a fairly good rule of thumb (which was not, however, infallible) was that when Khrushchev was out of town, only one of the two First Deputy Chairmen would act in his absence. As often as not, the Deputy who was not "acting" would himself be out of town. It may be a sign of the times that this week both First Deputies were acting and identified by their titles during Khrushchev's absence.

If a sort of "collective spirit" reigned in Moscow, it did not extend to the countryside. In Tula, for example, Khrushchev's portrait was displayed over May Day to the exclusion of others, sometimes in tandem with that of LENIN. No portrait series of Presidium members such as were displayed in Moscow were apparent in Tula. There was one display showing Lenin, Brezhnev, and Khrushchev together, and a few of MARX and ENGELS. In Kiev, according to members of the USIA Medical Exhibition now in that city, the Khrushchev cult rode high during May Day. A Western diplomat who was in Tbilisi during May Day stated that not one portrait of Stalin was in evidence. Nor, for that matter, were there any of Khrushchev except in occasional group depictions of the Presidium. In Tbilisi, it was Marx, Engels, and Lenin all the way.

The denigration of Stalin also went a step further during the week by publication of an article in Pravda on May 7 entitled, "The Triumphant Course to the Socialist Revolution." Ostensibly, it was published in honor of the 45th anniversary of the VII All-Russian Conference of Bolsheviks. Although the article takes a swipe at Trotsky, its main purpose appears to be to question Stalin as an authority in the field of nationalities question, the one area, in which, up to now he was still accepted as something of an authority. The article reads, in part, "The conference discussed the nationalities question (rapporteur I. V. Stalin) and accepted a resolution on the nationalities question written by V. I. Lenin." That some change might be forthcoming in the nationalities policies of the USSR was further indicated by Pravda on May 9, which reported the convention in Tashkent of an All-Union and inter-institute scientific conference "on the triumph of the Leninist nationalities policy." Presidium Candidate-Member and Uzbek Party First Secretary Sh. R. RASHIDOV addressed the conference on the subject "The XXII Congress on the Development of National Relationships During the Period of the Building of Communism."

On May 7, it was announced that a USSR Party-Government delegation headed by Khrushchev would visit Bulgaria in the middle of May. The projected visit will be Khrushchev's first foreign visit since his meeting with President KENNEDY nearly a year ago. The announcement, and the press campaign building up towards the departure date, have been played in a very low key in contrast to ebullient press propaganda connected with previous Khrushchev visits abroad. Khrushchev has made 11 trips outside the borders of the USSR since his September 15-28, 1959, visit to the US. Only one, the visit to China from September 29 to October 10, 1959, was described as a "Party-State" affair. All the other visits abroad have been described either as "Party" or "State", and they all have been accompanied by much personal Khrushchev "cult" material.

Pravda's fiftieth anniversary celebration was commemorated in nearly all Soviet cities. All CPSU CC Presidium members, candidate-members and

secretaries were reported as participating in these, with the exception of G.I. VORONOV, First Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Bureau, and D. S. POLYANSKIY, who is RSFSR Premier. Both are full members of the Presidium, with special responsibilities for agriculture. They were reported to be in the provinces at Omsk and Baranaul, respectively.

The April 26 return of CC Secretary L. F. ILYICHEV from a Bulgarian Party ideological conference held in Sofia preceded by only a few days the announcement of Khrushchev's "mid-May" trip to Bulgaria. It is difficult not to attempt to associate these two events. On May 9, Ilyichev was in yet another foreign city, this time Prague, where he headed the Soviet delegation to festivities connected with the 17th anniversary of liberation of Czechoslovakia from Hitler's Germany.

11. Two New Krays Formed in Kazakhstan. Tselinnyy Kray was formed in December 1960, consolidating the five northern oblasts of Kazakhstan. Apparently that change has wrought the desired effect, for, on May 3, two additional krays were formed in Kazakhstan, consolidating the administrations of six more oblasts to the south and west of that sprawling, arid republic. It was announced that the change was designed to utilize the resources of the Republic more effectively. It remains to be seen whether extensive personnel changes accompanying the Tselinnyy consolidation will also occur in the two new krays (Despatch No. 990 of May 7, 1962). There are still three eastern oblasts in Kazakhstan which are not as yet incorporated into a kray. One of them is Alma Ata oblast in which the Republic capital is located.

12. A New Book Continues The Fight Against Religion. A new book entitled "The Basic Questions of Scientific Atheism" has been published in Moscow (released to the press January 26). It achieves approximately the same literary level as its better-known companion, "Sputnit Ateista", which, for three years, has been a leader in its field. The new book, however, may be considered more literary. It has no pictures. Significantly, the book contains a chapter giving reasons for the existence in the USSR of "religious remnants" and a chapter on the relation the Communist party and the Soviet Government have to religion and churches. There are separate sections on Christians, Moslems, Jews, and Buddhists. There are no new arguments.

Recent reports of the closing of religious institutions obviously are not unrelated to the appearance of the new book. Embassy travelers to Tula over the weekend report that a large Orthodox church along side the road midway between Tula and Moscow which they tried to enter, was closed. Passersby--local citizens--said that the church had been closed "last summer", i.e., summer, 1961.

13. Most Changes in the Komsomol Rules are Minor: Minimum Age Requirement Dropped to 14. Among other things, the 14th Congress of the Young Communist League which recently concluded (see WEEKAS No. 17 and 18) rewrote the Ustav, or By-laws of the Komsomol. Changes in the rules as measured by verbiage are considerable, but changes of substance are not numerous. Naturally, the Communist moral code which was written into both the Party Program and the Party Ustav at the XXII Congress, was also incorporated into

the Komsomol Ustav. Previously the Komsomol was described as a "non-Party mass" organization (bezpartinaya). Today the stress is on democracy for the Komsomol has become an "independent action society" (samodeyatel'naya obshchestvennaya organizatsiya) (Komsomolskaya Pravda, April 21). Paralleling other actions taken at the XXII Congress, a paragraph has been added providing for "renewal" of the Komsomol leadership. This renewal principle was applied wholesale to the Komsomol Central Committee itself. Only slightly more than 10 percent of the new Central Committee previously were members of the Komsomol Central organs.

The most important change was the lowering of the minimal age requirement for membership to 14 years. Previously a Soviet youth or girl had to be 15 to join the Komsomol. This change is intended to increase the influence of the Komsomol on children of school age. A proposal to reduce the maximum age permitted for membership from 28 to 27 or 26, was rejected on the grounds that the "experience" of the older persons was needed in the organization. The top Komsomol leadership, of course, never came under that provision.

MILITARY

Negative

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

Boris H. Klosson

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Counselor for Political Affairs

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